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BRIDGING THE GAP. AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
COMPARATIVE METHOD IN HISTORICAL SCIENCES 
 
MIHAI CHIOVEANU 
 
 
Thinking without comparison is 
unthinkable. And in the absence of comparison, 
so is all scientific thought and scientific research. 
 
S w a n s o n  
 
 
 
Over the last half of the 20
th
 century it was mainly for the conflicting 
metaphors to shape the historian‟s discourse on what was, beyond the Iron 
Curtain, Eastern Europe. The situation did not change much after 1989. In 
many respects, at least in the case of historiography, annus mirabilis has not 
come by that time. One notable exception somehow occurred in that many 
historians are looking today at three different, although (re)invented regions: 
Central, Southeastern and Eastern Europe, when pursuing their analysis. Yet 
this is of not much help and sometimes it more or less impedes the work of the 
historian as long as the dialogue of the deaf continues to epitomize his/her 
methodological and theoretical approach
1
.  
Too busy to reconstruct the Past as a unique series of events, historians 
often claim that general laws and monothetic statements are not universally 
true. Stubborn in their emphasis on time, space, and circumstances, they fear 
that large theoretical frames might lead them to a diffuse result.  Possible errors 
of measurement and the fact that a comprehensive set of social variables and 
descriptive characteristics will never be completed are invoked to uphold their 
reluctance. Although some of them finally agree to accept a limited degree of 
                                                          
1  PETER BURKE, “Overture: the New History, its Past and its Future”, in Peter Burke (ed.), New 
Perspective on Historical Writing, The Pennsylvania State University Press, and History and 
Social Theory, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Historians are in general reluctant 
with regard to interdisciplinary research. Some disregard not only the achievements of social 
science, political science, anthropology but also the new perspectives on historical writing such as 
history from below and oral history. 
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generalization they never cease to assert that empirical historical outcomes 
should not be treated as “raw materials”2. Moreover, many nationalist-nativists 
remain in deep isolation in their search for „unique and incomparable 
expression of indigenous factors‟3. For them, the national state still represents 
the only convenient framework. Thus, what they are striving for is not 
„exceptionalism‟ but predestination, a deep anachronism. Only rarely do they 
cross this clear-cut bound, and even then, they reject intra-regional perspectives 
and the historical experience of the neighboring countries. Instead, as a 
profound expression of their cultural bovarity, nativists prefer to link national 
history with the European encountering. Therefore, they only came to 
uncritically accept theories of modernity, dependency, backwardness, and lack 
on a more useful search for guiding hypothesis and material for questionnaires. 
At the same time, historians from outside the region still operate with 
overarching theories that are now shaded by historical data that aim to indicate 
their familiarity with the topic. Thus, many of them finally come to be „trapped‟ 
into the logic of the nativist. Only few are looking at regional historical 
outcomes and phenomena from a comparative perspective. Even then, many 
limit themselves to tracing lines of evolution, searching for resemblances and 
differences, putting them in balance and finally extracting convenient 
conclusions. Cases which do not fit in the frame are simply left outside. This 
combination of western theoretical models and local historical data often proved to 
be 'deadly' as it ended in misleading interpretations. 
 Fascism in Central and Southeastern Europe is an illustrative, not to say 
paradigmatic, example in this sense. There is so far only one comparative 
approach on this topic that takes into account Hungary and Romania
4
. Nativists 
prefer to talk about extreme right and simply refuse to admit any discussion on 
Generic Fascism. Nonetheless, many outstanding scholars from the West 
consider fascisms in this part of Europe as marginal, aborted, simple copies of 
European fascism. Few, such as Eugen Weber, discuss them as variant cases 
while others, such as Renzo de Felice and Peter Wiles, deny the very existence 
of fascism in this region and translate the phenomenon in terms of nationalist 
populism. Finally, some, like Veiga and Heinen (in the case of Romanian 
fascism), try to present those cases as contributions to the understanding of 
European fascism but fail in their attempt while focusing excessively on 
presenting local/national data and interpreting them in a proper manner
5
.  
                                                          
2  CHARLES C. RAGIN, The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies, University of California Press, p. 11. 
3  However, as long as they cannot invent a distinct language, they do appeal to qualitative 
breaks, and present history as a series of reductions in order to make it understandable for the reader. 
4  NICHOLAS NAGY-TALAVERA, The Green Shirts and the Others. A History of Fascism 
in Hungary and Rumania, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California, 1970. 
5  See FRANCISCO VEIGA, Istoria Gărzii de Fier. Mistica ultranaţionalismului, Humanitas, 
Bucharest, 1995, and ARMIN HEINEN, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail. O contribuţie istorică 
la înţelegerea fascismului internaţional, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1998. Veiga insists on the 
existence of a palingenetic ultranationalism as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 
2 
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Without being a „universal panacea‟ or „talisman of knowledge‟ but a 
„tool, sometimes not so easy to manipulate‟ as March Bloch puts it, the 
comparative method can help historians to surpass insurmountable differences 
that occur in different terms between core and marginal cases or, generally 
speaking, distinct ones. It can „show‟ the way out of certain dilemmas and help 
them come to „universal‟ terms. The only necessary and sufficient condition for 
this is to admit that general phenomena can only be produced by equally 
general causes. That a parallel study of societies or civilizations, with or 
without common origins, that were at least once neighboring and/or 
contemporary, and were exposed to constant mutual influence and action of 
some broad causes, is worthy. After this first step is made the rest is to come. 
Limits in geographical frame and period of time, a critical and rigorous 
classification of objects of study, an attentive selection of questions are to 
provide richer results and make the work of the historian less risky and 
hypothetical yet also less imaginative – a traditionalist would say superficial. 
Historians accept that “bringing the seed to light is not the same thing as 
to show the causes for its germination”. Some might also agree that “the unity 
of place is only disorder” and “Only the unity of problem makes a center”. 
From this perspective it seems that the question is not whether we should 
compare, but rather what is it worth comparing? The answer to this question 
might offer the historian who admits that a one way road in historical 
interpretation is no longer possible a minimum of confidence that he or she is 
not going to follow paths that might prove to be „blind alleys‟. 
By their nature, historians trust the idiographic interpretative method 
based on thick description and rather wary of sociology with its essential 
typological method. Nevertheless, some are looking for regularity and 
generalization that helps them evaluate cases relative to substantive theoretical 
criteria but dislike to go far beyond findings, to challenge historicism and 
counterfactual reasoning. What they fear most is that they might fall apart of 
„tradition‟. Some do not even realize that in Weber‟s works, whom they often 
quote at least for his ideal (weberian) type, they can find a good example of 
how one can bridge the gap between human agency and persistent historical 
structures, between small events and huge developments and processes. When 
they finally do realize the importance of Weber‟s work, they only come to 
appreciate the way in which a comparativist historical sociologist conceived 
history as a network of dynamic processes and alternate paths of development. 
Others might emphasize his methodological individualism, his definition of 
social action, the methodological canon. Yet few are able to understand that 
what is first of all important is the way in which Weber partly transcends the 
assumptions of his own culture and therefore avoids the risks of incoherence 
that prevail in the search for the unique and concrete
6
. 
                                                                                                                                              
fascism, while Heinen tries to compare the political movements, encompassing too many 
differences between the cases and finally comes to restrict his focus on the Iron Guard as a 
particular case. For the same reason, the existence of too many particularities, Klaus P. Beer 
stated that the Romanian phenomenon can not and should not be understood in terms of fascism. 
6  FRITZ RINGER, Max Weber’s Methodology. The Unification of the Cultural and Social 
Sciences, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 168-174. 
3 
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It is hard to say what comparativism can offer to a historian since there is 
no clear definition of it and since a rigorous method has not emerged so far, due 
to the holistic feature of this kind of approach. Instead, no matter the 
methodological decisions, any comparative approach will lead to unavoidable 
political implications. Furthermore, historians will always argue that it is 
important who makes comparison and when, claiming that a dose of relativity in 
relevance and importance always occurs
7
. However, one might include in an 
attempt to define the comparative inquiry its search for general statements and 
laws that helps to define phenomena and explain them. Recognizable patterns 
can be added here as they help to demonstrate that societies undergo structured 
processes of development. Nonetheless, the twin goals of this method – to explain 
and to interpret macro-social variation – are also of utmost importance. As for the 
way in which the comparative method operates
8
, things are a little complicated as 
there are three main distinct logics and also pairs of those that can be employed
9
.  
All those theoretical guides are to help the historian, show him what is he 
looking for in order to avoid superficiality, offer some valuable variables such as 
economic development, political dependency, political culture, industrialization 
and urbanization; impose and paradoxically eliminate limits as long as it is for 
the investigator to set the boundaries. One might operate at a micro or macro 
level (although he can use them simultaneously), go from class to world system, 
introduce explanatory and observational units alongside with units of analysis
10
. 
There is only one thing comparability depends on, and this is the degree of 
generality that makes possible the step from what is unique to what is 
meaningful and „universal‟ and thus ensure communication beyond limits.  
A clear definition of objects or „units of analysis‟ as well as the use of 
clear concepts that define something holistic is needed in this case. Aware of 
the fact that the discourse about reality is not the same with reality itself, one 
might understand if it is proper to employ them and thus, avoid the danger of 
mystification while using idealizing words. For example, fascism is generally 
defined as an „interwar European (political) phenomenon‟, and many 
outstanding scholars of fascism oppose its extended application in the case of 
other categories that only resemble it
11. However, the label „fascism‟ was often 
applied in an unproper way even during the interwar period. It was mainly for the 
                                                          
7  MARIA TODOROVA, Balcanii şi balcanismul, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2000, p. 232, referring to 
Szucs‟ study “The three regions of Europe”, published in the 1980‟s. 
8  CHARLES C. RAGIN, op. cit., p. 34. The simplest way in which the method works is to 
start from cases that share a common outcome, look for similarities, than for causal relevances 
and finally come to general explanations. When differences and deviations occur, that is not to 
indicate that the causal relation is not good. One might interpret this as a variety and a sense of 
originality, and thus only accept a greater challenging task. Or, he might accept such a negative 
case in order to check the validity of the theory in the rest of the selected cases. 
9  THEDA SKOCHPOL, MARGARET SOMERS, “The uses of comparative history in 
macro-social inquiry”, in Theda Skochpol (ed.), Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 
Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
10  CHARLES C. RAGIN, op. cit., p. 7. 
11  ROGER EATWELL, Fascism. A History, New York, Penguin Books, USA, 1997, pp. xix-xxi. 
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opponents of fascism to do so and use this label in cases where it was not accurate 
to. In contrast, many followers of fascism rejected the label and emphasized 
distinctiveness (legionarism, falangism), although they admitted the existence of an 
International Fascism. Following this path, many nativists in Eastern Europe reject 
today the discussion on fascism in particular cases and prefer to emphasize „extreme 
right‟ as a more accurate and comprehensive category when it comes to describing 
different phenomena that occurred at national level. Sometimes they are not even 
aware of the fact that fascism is no longer translated in terms of extreme right in the 
Western academia. That several categories of fascism (left, right and center) are 
now taken into account by political scientists and that some sociologists, like 
Andreski, approach fascism as a center of two political extremes
12
. 
In order to avoid this and make fascism understandable in various 
particular cases, one might go beyond specific historical outcomes and „translate‟ 
fascism as a middle-class phenomenon, an opposition to proletarian uprising, as 
a political-national and social revolution, or introduce variables in order to 
analyze it in terms of modernization, urbanization, industrialization, social mobility. 
Yet he/she might encompass difficulties in formulating historical explanations, 
especially when it comes to interpret differences, and this is due the existence 
of some relevant standards
13
, and the extensive use of rather static definitions.  
The discussion on middle-classes‟ role in the birth of European fascism no 
longer makes a mandatory, yet crucial and reliable, point case in Western literature 
on fascism. The interpretation of the history of middle classes, Mitelstand or classes 
moyennes as a „prehistory of fascism‟ is no longer en vogue14. The former definition 
of a standard, homogeneous, European middle class is out of work today, and 
historians now emphasize a certain degree of nuances among cases at the core level 
as well as within particular societies, and focus on different categories, different 
political counsciousnesses, and different long term significances. Small town and 
rural, and not only big cities middle classes come under scrutiny. Middle classes as 
an „expression of class conflict‟ lost their previous importance while circumstances 
in which different categories evolve, their social mobility and political dynamics are 
now on stage. However, in the case of Romania, the situation is completely 
different. The absence of a middle-class in its classic formula is underlined and thus 
one of the main peculiarities of Romanian fascism is stressed. Not only its existence 
                                                          
12  SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Political Man. The Social Bases of  Politics, The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1981.  
13  Without paying too much attention to bounds and standards, an anthropologist would look 
for common roots and common attitudes, leave apart differences in terms of background and 
followed paths, and interpret differences in terms of harmony and completion and not necessarily 
contradiction and isolation. He would only raise questions on what advantage or handicap, and 
authentic means for he would make sense of comparing not nations or states, but cultures. Thus, beyond a 
certain degree of relativity, he would strive merely for what is really significant in the discussion. 
14  Geoffrey Crossick, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.), Shopkeepers and Master Artisans in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, Methuen, London and New York, p. 6.  
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during the 19
th
 century but also its visibility after 1918 within mass politics and 
times of crisis is underestimated – i.e. the importance in politics of the radical and 
suspicious, anti-Semite, anti-proletarian and anti-big finances
15
 generation of white 
collars from the 1930‟s, a generation who at least in part is the outgrowth of 
enduring categories of shopkeepers and artisans.
 
Taking all those into account, a 
comparative study at a micro-social level might indicate what patterns can tell us 
more about the significance of different categories of middle classes, and their role 
in politics as part of an electorate in a state of uproar. Moreover, it might show what 
specific issues to address in order to avoid typologies that equate in the case of both 
middle-classes and fascism in Romania
16
.   
Almost the same situation occurs in the case of the working class and the 
birth of fascism as a response to proletarian upheaval. As many nativists in Romania 
are mainly concerned today to offer a theoretical justification in response and in 
opposition to the previous, Marxist one, they often come to claim that there was no 
working class in interwar Romania or, if there was one, that it was too marginal and 
insignificant. Thus, they are only accepting the image of a backward, dependant 
society, translating everything in terms of status, emphasizing the image of a 
stagnant, traditional and not post-traditional
17
 peasant world dominated by 
clientelism and a powerful, centralized and in many respects traditionalist state as 
the only agent of change
18
. From this perspective, fascism is to be understood in 
terms of „internal displacement‟, a helpful theoretical point but at the same time a 
„vivant‟ denial of any particularity of fascism and its variants. Beyond this, many 
historians encompass serious difficulties when it comes to explain, when they 
choose not to minimize or simply disregard, the noteworthy revolutionary upheaval 
of the Romanian proletariat in the aftermath of the first World War, with is 
numerous strikes, the existence of „red‟ unions in conflicts with the „yellow‟ unions 
backed by police and armed forces that finally asked for a brutal intervention of an 
authoritarian, brutal state. Nonetheless, they can hardly explain the significant 
attraction exercised in the 1930s by the „archangelic socialism‟ of the Iron Guard 
among workers
19, not to mention the fact that many „red‟ legionari joined the 
                                                          
15  In this particular case represented by the state, a state which in 1937 for the first time was 
unable to manipulate elections due to a massive lack of support from the part of its white collars. 
16 Geoffrey Crossick, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.), op. cit., p. 26. 
17 See for a definition of post-traditional societies S. N. EISENSTADT, “Post-traditional 
societies and the continuity and reconstruction of tradition”, in idem (ed.), Post-Traditional 
Societies, WW Norton & Company INC., New York, pp. 1-3. See also E. HOBSBAWM, The 
Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 1-6. 
18  Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), Social Change in Romania (1860-1940). A Debate on Development in a European 
Nation, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley 1978, and Daniel Chirot (ed.), 
The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989. 
19  An agrarian state, interwar Romania did not experience market economy. However, it is not 
to say the same thing with regard to capitalism and industrialization or the existence of a working 
class „manufacturing goods, with the aid of machineries, and in exchange for wages‟. If its efforts 
to improve its position on the labor market and its weak political organization are not impressive, 
this is due to the unfavorable circumstances of that time. After its participation in the „short 
episode of Great socialist family resemblance across national boundaries‟, the Romanian working 
class, at least parts of it, joined the Iron Guard as the only mass party striving for a fundamental 
change and offering its followers a revolutionary (even if not based only on class) interpretation 
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Romanian Communist Party after 1944, and definitely not for opportunistic reasons.  
As long as no „theoretical norm‟ is to be enforced today, a comparative 
study that would include Romania might allow historians to perceive it not as a 
deviant but rather as a different case of working class formation.  Its unique 
configuration and distinct dynamics, as well as the combination of local factors, 
might contribute to the understanding of broad development and resulting 
structure of working class and suggest a new array of patterns
20
. Nonetheless it 
might tell something about what is, if at all, „revolutionary‟ within the nature of 
fascism and not only legionarism.   
While choosing to look at fascism from the perspective of the 
Revolution, one would make sense of macro-social inquiry. Although the 
historian has to bear in mind that in none of the cases of fascism the classic 
definition of revolution will work entirely and also that some historians (i.e. 
Ernst Nolte) will argue that fascism, as part of the European Civil War, merely 
represents a counterrevolution. However, if one decides to pursue such an 
analysis, he/she might first look at different models of revolution like the one 
proposed by James Davies in When Men Revolt and Why as useful and 
profitable. Delineating Revolutions in consecutive stages: causes and 
precipitating conditions, followed by alignment of classes and parties, 
mobilization and demobilization, and finally a revolutionary outcome as an 
alternative to misery and progressive degradation; and translating them in terms 
of rising expectations and disappointments by a down turn, the existence of an 
angry public, as well as the possibility to approach revolution on a mass and 
also individual psychological basis would considerably reduce the burden of a 
long, extremely laborious and yet risky enterprise. For example, the case of 
1930s Romania fits perfectly within Davies‟ model. Not even the observations 
and nuances introduced by Charles Tilly (the fact that Davies‟ model lacks to 
show what satisfactions are crucial, what leads to frustration, and whether or 
not there is a link between an existing discontent and the seizure of power) are 
to impede in this particular case. Moreover, the structural circumstances 
introduced by Tilly: the military vulnerability of the state, the internal 
organization of opposition, and the character of coalition among classes
21
, 
almost perfectly match the reality of interwar Romania in the late 1930s, when 
a right wing revolution, at least an attempt of, occurred. Although tempting, 
because it opens an unlimited field, such a model is unsatisfactory as it lacks 
comparison and neglects structures. Instead, the kind of analysis proposed by 
                                                                                                                                              
of social reality. This is to explain somehow the fact that, like the French socialists, Codreanu 
managed to persuade many members of the proletariat with the help of the model of non-
participation in government under capitalism.  
20  ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, “How Many Exceptionalism?”, in Ira Katznelson, Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.), 
Working-Class Formation. Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, 
Princeton University Press, p. 400. 
21  CHARLES TILLY, Big Structures. Large Processes. Huge Comparison, Russel Sage 
Foundation, New York, pp.103-105. 
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Barrington Moore in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
22
, and the 
different types of revolutions it introduces might help understand the history of 
a specific country.  
Barrington Moore makes a special room for fascism as the outcome of a 
„revolution from above‟, an alternative political route to modern world that 
includes the development of capitalism by a relatively weak bourgeoisie and in 
the absence of a complete liquidation of landowners. Germany fits perfectly in 
this definition, yet Romania does not. In fact, according to the categories Moore 
introduces interwar Romania can be described as a stalled democracy (failure 
of serious rural transformation), although the intention and impression of the 
political elites was that in 1918 a bourgeois revolution that led the country to 
liberal democracy took place. Nevertheless, in the 1930s Romania ended, due 
to a forced industrialization and nation-building process, in a revolution from 
above and in fascism. Only now the real problem occurs, as the Iron Guard, the 
most important fascist movement in Romania, always emphasized the idea of a 
revolution from below while addressing huge masses of peasants and not only 
intellectuals, blue and white collars and army officers.  
How to make sense of all these perspectives? Should one substitute 
investigation on such specific cases or overemphasize some facts just to make 
them fit into theory? Should a case such as the Romanian one be treated as 
roughly negative, in order to test the validly of already accepted theories? Not 
necessarily, for one might start asking useful and new questions. Who were the 
fascists in Romania? Did Romania experience a rebellion or a revolution in 
1941? Can we talk about fascism in Romania? Or, he may take Romania as a disparate 
case that did experience fascism, and then use the comparative method to 
search for new historical generalizations. A contrast-oriented analysis would make 
sense in this case. Not only because the historical integrity of each case would be 
preserved, and the use of ideal-types is possible. It is the fact that two, or three, 
maximally different countries that are placed, or not, geographically at the 
extremes of one civilization, participate in different ways, to certain different 
degrees and with different results to its history while sharing only their 
affiliation to something, can form „at least a kind of commentary on one 
another character‟.  
                                                          
22  Unlike Theda Skochpol, Barrington Moore does not come to universalizing terms on revolutions and 
does not offer a full independent weight to the state. Instead, Moore takes advantage of variations while 
looking not only for successful revolutions and thus came to Randal‟s assertion that “a theory of 
revolutions should be a theory of the conditions for various kinds of revolutions”. 
8 
